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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years after the reunification of the 
country divided into two parts after the Second 
World War, Germany faces a number of challenges 
related to immigration, integration and asylum 
that preoccupy the political class and provoke 
mobilization in the streets. It is no longer possible 
to deny that migration and the resulting diversity of 
religions and cultural backgrounds are permanent 
facts of life for the country. The prospect of 
demographic decline, coupled with a still-growing 
economy, strengthens the labour-market case for 
immigration. In the area of citizenship, exclusionary 
patterns have been challenged and new discourses 
of nationality promise the possibility of belonging 
to “New Germans” that were previously excluded. 
In response to claims for equality and inclusion, 
some state actors seek to make space for pluralism 
within the country’s federal-corporatist system. In 
2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s welcoming stance 
towards refugees distinguished Germany from less 
hospitable practices in neighbouring countries.1
Despite promising signals, the German case 
reveals numerous contradictions as well as both 
exclusionary and inclusionary tendencies. Advances 
towards equality as well as challenges to racism and 
normalized practices of discrimination are often 
half-hearted and distributed unevenly across levels 
of government and among regions. “Integration” 
is the preferred term for addressing challenges 
of diversity, but it is loosely defined and qualified 
by far-ranging expectations of desirable conduct, 
which are variously justified with reference to liberal 
perfectionism, constitutional patriotism or cultural 
sameness. Thus, being “integrated” frequently 
amounts to an expectation of assimilation into a 
tightly monitored system of normative and cultural 
belonging, burdening newcomers and “post-
migrants” with the need to meet undefined, moving 
or unattainable targets.2 While there is evidence of 
more expansive understandings of national identity, 
“New Germans” continue to encounter exclusions 
that are not just residual but deeply ingrained, 
widely held and rarely challenged.3
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The circumstances of cultural diversity in Germany 
today reflect significant changes over a short 
period of time. In the early 1990s, the lasting 
impact of the labour migration that had facilitated 
post-1945 reconstruction was still scarcely 
acknowledged. The mantra that “Germany is not 
a country of immigration” (Deutschland ist kein 
Einwanderungsland) demonstrated historical 
denial and blindness to new constellations of 
religious and cultural diversity. Citizenship was 
often inaccessible to long-term residents and their 
children, and an Alien Act (Ausländergesetz) 
regulated the residency of non-citizens, including 
those who had been living in the country for 
decades. Ausländerpolitik—the combination of 
immigration, residency, citizenship and other 
policies concerned with the entry, presence and 
removal of “foreigners”—was still dominated by the 
paradigm of “return,” and the belief that migrants 
and their descendants were temporary and would 
return to their countries of origin.4
More recently, symbolic shifts and material policy 
changes have complicated this picture. The principle 
of jus soli (birthright citizenship) was added to 
citizenship law, thereby enabling some persons 
born in Germany to immigrant parents to claim 
citizenship. The reform of German citizenship 
law (Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht) in 2000 moved 
partially away from the predominant principle of 
ethno-cultural exclusion, which envisaged that 
citizenship could be claimed only by descendants 
of German parents. It introduced the possibility of 
jus soli, although its effect was limited, not least 
due to continued restrictions on dual citizenship. In 
2005, the Alien Act was replaced by an Immigration 
Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz), acknowledging that 
people had moved to Germany with the intention 
to remain. Yet, even a 2015 law that made dual 
citizenship more widely available still retained 
the principle that children born of non-German 
parents would have to abandon parental citizenship 
(unless they could demonstrate special ties and 
commitment). Symbolically, then, the revision of 
exclusionary citizenship laws only represents a 
partial acceptance of claims by “New Germans” to 
belong to Germany.
As in other European countries, right-wing 
populist parties have been increasingly successful, 
and there have been significant street-based 
mobilizations against policies recognizing cultural 
diversity and they attract a combination of far-
right and moderate  participants. The Alternative 
for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) 
Party and the extra-parliamentary PEGIDA 
(Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung 
des Abendlandes/Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamisation of the Occident) movement combine 
hostility towards immigrants, Muslims, and cultural 
and political elites. The response to the arrival of 
refugees in 2015–16 revealed tensions at the highest 
political levels and significant potentials for popular 
contention. Numerous attacks on refugee reception 
centres have been repeatedly condemned, but 
public authorities have also been criticized for their 
inadequate preparation for reception of migrants 
and the lenient policing of far-right protest. The 
New Year’s Eve 2016 incidents in Cologne have been 
widely debated, even if the link between the sexual 
assaults of women, the policies of Angela Merkel’s 
government and the reception of refugees from 
Syria and Iraq are tenuous.5 The reporting of the 
Cologne incidents has reinforced the perception that 
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new arrivals stand outside Germany’s value-based 
consensus. 
As this paper argues, parochial understandings 
of German citizenship and nationality have been 
challenged, but progress is neither seamless nor 
complete. There have been significant changes 
to law and policies, altering state objectives for 
governing diversity and reflecting a new willingness 
to accept, or at least acquiesce to, cultural diversity. 
Yet such changes do not erase legacies of exclusion 
and a desire to control or regulate “difference” 
that is deeply ingrained in political institutions. 
Moreover, the liberalization of German citizenship 
reinforces exclusions that are now predominantly 
justified with reference to constitutional values and 
liberal civilization. 
With an interest in these contradictions, this paper 
examines: citizenship policies and the symbolic 
negotiation of national identity; changes to the 
German corporatist framework and its suitability 
for multi-religious diversity; and the inclusion 
of newcomers and settled populations in labour 
markets. It considers novelty and continuity in this 
change experience and comments on pivot points 
available for progress towards pluralism.
II. ORIGINS AND RESPONSES 
TO DIVERSITY: STATE, 
PEOPLE, NATION
The self-conscious adaptation of German national 
identity to new circumstances, often with profound 
consequences for minority and migrant populations, 
requires particular attention here. Post-1945 
nationhood was open to different interpretations, 
motivated by the goal to emphasize discontinuity 
with National Socialist rule (1933–45) and to 
align the Federal Republic with Western allies, 
as well as for the purpose of post-war nation-
building. As a result, a preoccupation with the 
national image acted as an ambiguous influence in 
policy-making about immigration and citizenship. 
The crucial decision to forego the mandatory 
rotation back to the country of origin of “guest 
worker” migrants in the 1950s and early 1960s, for 
example, reflected a concern with international 
perceptions and a desire for liberal-democratic 
normality. As Phil Triadafilopoulos and Karen 
Schönwälder summarize: “West Germany was not 
only determined to rebuild its economy; it was also 
keenly interested in presenting a new face to the 
world—an avowedly liberal democratic persona that 
distanced the Federal Republic from its past.”6 Yet 
the desire to retain a deliberately unfinished version 
of nationality in anticipation of reunification with 
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 
also allowed for, and justified, exclusionary policies 
towards “guest workers” and their descendants. 
The main point of the historical sketch presented 
here is to remind us that political circumstances 
of national image-making matter and have 
shaped discourses of nationality in Germany. 
This is certainly the case for the departure from 
ethno-culturally exclusive understandings of 
national identity and the emergence of a “civic 
definition,” which have both been circulating in 
political discourse and civil society over the last 
two decades. The promise of this “civic turn” in the 
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German case is not simply a more welcoming stance 
towards newcomers, and settled post-immigrant 
populations that are able to claim civic belonging, 
but also the symbolically-laden “normalization” of 
national identity.7 As the paper suggests here, such 
symbolic shifts are important to consider, but they 
do not mean that exclusions that were based on an 
ethno-cultural idea of national identity have simply 
disappeared.
The starting point for the narrative underpinning 
the “civic turn” is a widely held account that, until 
the late 1990s, located German national identity at 
an ethno-cultural and primordial level.8 Whereas 
belonging to the French nation could be attained 
through civic assimilation, this was not the case 
in Germany, where claims to belonging depended 
on fundamental cultural traits linked to family 
descent and culture. Such notions were confirmed 
in the principle of jus sanguinis, which, until 1999, 
provided the predominant path towards citizenship. 
Rates of naturalization were low. Where citizenship 
was legally accessible, exclusionary notions of 
national belonging discouraged candidates from 
seeking it.
One question about the direction of change 
since 1990 and the reunification of Germany is 
whether this story of ethnic exclusion can now 
be abandoned in favour of a new, inclusionary 
narrative. Has Germany moved conclusively 
“beyond ethnoculturalism”? Have membership 
and belonging come to approximate the civic 
universalism characteristic of neighbouring 
countries, including France or the United Kingdom, 
that have a better record of turning newcomers into 
citizens?
For the German case, these are not simply empirical 
questions, but part of an ongoing reflection about 
what is “normal.” In a headline finding for its 
annual “barometer” of immigrant integration, the 
Council of German Foundations on Integration 
and Migration suggested that “the ‘slumberous’ 
(verschlafen) immigration country’ Germany 
no longer needs to shy away from international 
comparison.”9 The report attested, with some pride, 
to the claim that the country now fell squarely 
within, or even exceeded, standards of constructive 
immigration policy-making in neighbouring 
countries of Western Europe.10 This observation 
may be empirically accurate, but the historical 
meta-narrative of a “Long Road West” (Germany’s 
delayed approximation of the civic norms and 
practices that prevail in Western Europe) is also 
present in such accounts.11 The weight of national 
self-images is evident in progressive contributions 
to debates over immigration and also illustrated 
in the sense of pride regarding the popularity of 
Germany as a new destination country, which may 
help explain the welcoming response to refugees in 
2015.
Some observers who argue for a long-standing 
paradigm of ethno-cultural nationhood as the 
foundation for the national community claim that 
it took shape in the 19th century. Rogers Brubaker, 
a well-known proponent of this view, notes that 
German citizenship, which he identifies as “Volk-
centered and differentialist,” emerged in response 
to the fragmentation between political units on 
German territory, which “fostered the development 
of an ethnocultural understanding of nationhood.”12 
This argument draws on Friedrich Meinecke’s 
(1908) earlier distinction between the German 
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Kulturnation and Staatsnationen, the latter being 
nations defined in civic terms, especially France.13 
This legacy, Brubaker suggests, was re-activated 
after 1949 when the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG, West Germany) was created. The provisional 
nature of the FRG’s arrangements for membership, 
anticipating an eventual reunification with East 
Germany, enshrined the ethno-cultural paradigm.14 
Non-resident but ethnic Germans could easily claim 
German citizenship, whereas residents who were 
not ethnic German remained at arm’s length.
Yet for 19th-century nation-building and state-
formation, as well as after 1945, it is difficult to 
understand the weight of ethno-cultural and civic 
paradigms without considering specific political 
circumstances that are often contradictory. Drawing 
attention to such contradictions, some observers 
dispute the idea of stable ethno-cultural tendencies 
in the 19th century.15 The aspiration in the 
Revolution of 1848 towards the democratic unity 
of ethnic Germans failed. The eventual unification 
of 26 kingdoms, duchies and principalities into the 
German Empire in 1871 under Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck was dictated by Prussian raison d’État; it 
was a conservative project. The right-wing adoption 
of the theme of ethno-cultural nationality became 
more pronounced later, in the Wilhelmine period 
(1890–1918) and reflected important political re-
orientations. The “shift from left and liberal to right 
and conservative nationalism” was a phenomenon 
of the third quarter of the 19th century, which 
saw the “usurpation of the national message by 
conservative forces” as well as the decline of liberal 
nationalism in a context of political instability.16 
Reinhard Rürup observes for this period also that 
“liberal-bourgeois emancipation did not represent 
a first step towards envisioning a permanent 
presence for minorities and their equal standing,” 
and late 19th-century German liberalism became 
entwined with aggressive ethno-national posturing 
on the inside and Wilhelmine expansionism 
internationally.17
These political shifts and turns, and their 
continuation today, complicate the understanding of 
German history as the long unfolding of an ethno-
cultural logic. Indeed, there were—and still are—
significant variations among different regions and 
authorities. Until 1934, German national citizenship 
resulted from provincial citizenship in provinces 
such as Prussia, Bavaria or Württemberg.18 Their 
citizenship laws did not rely exclusively on descent 
for citizenship acquisition. Until 1913, provinces 
tended to strip long-term emigrants (to the United 
States and elsewhere) of the right to citizenship, a 
fact that is difficult to reconcile with any absolute 
principle of the reliance on family descent. In 
other words, there are at least complications in the 
narrative of continuity between citizenship and 
immigration in the post-war Federal Republic and 
19th-century themes of ethno-cultural homogeneity.
Civic and ethno-cultural concerns are not 
necessarily irreconcilable and can be stated 
in terms, such as with the concept of “over-
foreignization” (Überfremdung), that allow for 
changing uses.19 As an instance of Überfremdung, 
the infiltration of Germany by “alien cultures” was 
already invoked to justify coercive policies towards 
Polish-speaking labour migrants in the late 19th 
century.20 Against the danger of “Polonization” 
there was the desire for biological or culturally racist 
superiority, anticipating the dominant ideology 
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after 1933.21 More recently, the term underpins the 
view that immigration constitutes an “infiltration of 
the German people [and] the Überfremdung of our 
language, culture and nationhood (Volkstum).”22 It 
continues to appear in the conservative mainstream, 
where important policymakers suggest that 
“culturally alien immigration” (kulturfremde 
Einwanderung) into the welfare system needs to 
be fought “to the last bullet.”23 Yet, Überfremdung 
can also more simply refer to a lack of familiarity, 
pointing to a sense of homeliness that immigrants 
threaten to disturb. Or, it may be described as a 
calculated risk that can be endured, as the current 
Minister for the Interior suggests in the context 
of the “refugee crisis,” as long as it corresponds 
to a strong insistence on “our values” and an 
emphasis on Christianity as a common ground.24 
As Überfremdung’s multiple uses show, there is 
significant flexibility in the argument invoked to 
express anxiety over cultural diversity.
The defence of Germany’s liberal achievements 
has become an important element in mobilizations 
against pluralism and these too allow for similar 
flexibility. The allegation is that newcomers pose a 
threat to Germany’s liberal consensus, specifically 
by undercutting established standards and progress 
on homosexuality, women’s rights and secularism.25 
This position draws on patchy reports of illiberal 
attitudes among new migrants, and was fuelled by 
the sexual offences and thefts committed during 
Cologne’s 2016 New Year’s Eve celebrations. 
Over 1,000 criminal complaints were filed, many 
detailing incidents of women being swarmed 
and sexually assaulted by groups of men. The 
perpetrators were allegedly of North African and 
Arab descent, and assumed to be asylum seekers, 
though their immigration statuses were largely 
unknown. Such incidents have become a rallying 
cry amongst commentators that invoke a hard-
edged liberalism for (often illiberal and coercive 
ways of) engaging Muslims. Whereas some other 
countries have only recently adopted exclusionary 
policies in the interest of defending liberal values, 
there is a particularly strong precedent for this type 
of “illiberal liberalism” in Germany: the defence 
of constitutional principles and liberal-democratic 
order (freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung) 
against political antagonists during the Cold 
War. Yet the defence of the liberal order today 
often invokes more than just points of political 
disagreement. It alleges that Muslim immigrants, 
as much as German citizens of Muslim faith, stand 
outside a civilizational consensus for reasons 
that are not just civic or political, but result from 
essential and group-based character traits.
In summary, the analysis in this paper reinforces the 
sense that the German case is up for grabs. Citizens 
mobilize both to welcome and to protest the arrival 
of refugees. Political and legal changes that have 
been adopted indicate new openings for pluralism, 
but also retrenchment under the impression of 
the “refugee crisis.” Distinct practices among 
actors in the federal system complicate the case 
presented here. There is a patchwork of inclusionary 
and exclusionary practices as significant policy-
making powers in areas that are relevant for the 
accommodation of cultural diversity, such as 
health, education or church-state relations, lie 
with the German Länder (provinces). Exclusions 
that had been based on the idea of ethno-cultural 
homogeneity have not just been dismissed, but 
have also taken on new forms. Today’s reference 
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to a value-based consensus, as well as to notions 
of economic utility and deservingness, continue 
to be coloured by “culture.” As the paper suggests, 
anxiety about mixing and everyday hybridity has 
been carried forward too. Rather than paradigmatic 
shifts that would lead from one “model” to the next, 
specific political constellations require attention 
to understand the shape of current exclusions and 
potentials for pluralism. 
III. CASE NARRATIVE: 
PATTERNS OF INCLUSION 
AND EXCLUSION 
German reunification did not immediately produce 
a policy shift in the accommodation of cultural 
diversity (although changes to the Alien Act in 1990 
brought about some improvement to the status of 
non-citizen residents). Yet more cracks appeared 
at this point in the “the portrayal of Germany 
as an organic nation, a community of destiny.26 
The exclusionary status quo of citizenship law 
had become harder to defend and the reality of 
immigration more difficult to ignore. That resident 
non-citizens were going to “return” to their “home 
countries,” the dominant policy paradigm up to that 
point, had even more clearly been revealed to be a 
myth.27
Conservative constituencies that had blocked 
reform proposals on grounds of ethno-cultural 
parochialism also experienced a political decline 
that culminated in the defeat of the CDU/CSU 
(Christian Democratic Party/Christian Social Union 
of Bavaria) government in 1998, after 16 years 
in power. The new governing coalition of Social 
Democrats (SPD) and Greens set out to reform 
citizenship and immigration. These reforms were 
eventually adopted, constituting significant shifts 
in practical and symbolic terms. Together, they put 
immigration on the political agenda and facilitated 
access to citizenship.28 However, the moment was 
also marked by contentious exchanges in legislative 
arenas and electoral politics that limited the scope 
of reforms, and attested to continued unease about 
the direction of change.
This resistance is reflected in restrictions on 
dual citizenship that were imposed and stayed in 
place until 2015. In addition to citizenship and 
immigration, the fields of religious recognition 
and labour market incorporation merit attention 
because they, too, act as domains where the scope 
of pluralism is negotiated both symbolically and 
in policy terms. This section therefore considers 
tendencies of exclusion and inclusion by introducing 
episodes and cases for: (a) the area of citizenship, 
with a particular focus on language as well as 
law; (b) questions of religious accommodation, 
with a particular interest in the terms of religious 
incorporation; and (c) the economic sphere, 
drawing attention to the public negotiation of 
belonging and deservingness. 
Citizenship, Language and Belonging 
The arrival of a “normalized” national identity 
has been associated with the visibility of the 
national flag during the 2006 Football World Cup. 
Organizers promoted the event with the slogan 
“the world is visiting with friends” (Die Welt zu 
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Gast bei Freunden), highlighting an openness 
and hospitability towards “guests.” In public 
commentary, the celebratory patriotism of 2006 
was widely welcomed for the benevolent expression 
of national pride it was seen to convey.
It is unclear how far the performance of a hospitable 
self-image has changed the terms of belonging for 
post-migrants that are not merely visiting, however. 
Research by Naika Foroutan et al shows a significant 
disjuncture between majority and minority 
constructions of identity.29 On the one hand, a 
growing number of new arrivals and subsequent 
generations embrace a more open understanding 
that takes less notice of ethno-cultural boundaries. 
On the other hand, however, the popular portrayal 
of the second or third generation frequently 
highlights crisis. Accounts of “integration” trace 
success to individual efforts. More generally the 
notion of group-based failure is affirmed and 
the crisis of integration at the social level—the 
much-invoked failure of multiculturalism—is 
then mirrored in the troubled circumstances of 
stereotypical immigrant youth. In highly dramatized 
accounts, episodes of violence and educational 
failure are traced to cultural mis-adaptation and 
framed as deficiencies of integration. Supposedly 
caught between cultures, young post-migrants often 
feature either as perpetrators of violence or victims 
of circumstances beyond their control.30
There are inter-generational and other differences 
in these shifting portrayals of German identity. 
Familiarity, presence and visibility have a role to 
play in accounting for changing attitudes. Research 
suggests that increasing levels of contact for 
younger age groups corresponds with more positive 
attitudes towards diversity. Naika Foroutan et al’s 
2015 analysis found that understandings of German 
nationality appeared less restrictive among younger 
age groups. For example, 40% of respondents over 
the age of 25 consider the hijab to be incompatible 
with national belonging whereas the figure is only 
26% for younger respondents. Yet, at the same 
time, polling finds right-wing populists in the same 
age group, reflecting a growing polarization among 
young people.31
Therefore, if revised laws and understandings 
of German identity allow for new entrants, it is 
less clear how far change has gone and how this 
identity itself has been changed, unsettled or 
expanded. The much-invoked “welcoming culture” 
(Willkommenskultur) may capture an ideal of 
cosmopolitan hospitality, but it too reveals its 
limits.32 Tendencies in the politics of citizenship and 
language illustrate this tension between conditional 
incorporation and continued exclusion in law as 
well as politics and everyday life.
As noted, a tendency of liberalization, qualified by 
concerns over national unity and constitutional 
loyalty, underpins the revision of German 
citizenship law away from an overwhelming focus 
on jus sanguinis. Until the reform of citizenship 
law, naturalization required a legal residence of 15 
years and dual citizenship was impossible (with 
a few exceptions). The reforms of 2000 made 
naturalization easier by reducing the years of the 
residency requirement, although they also set the 
scene for new requirements of language capacity, 
cultural knowledge, and economic autonomy that 
were subsequently adopted. The new approach 
towards citizenship provides the most significant 
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piece of evidence for liberalizing tendencies, 
although it also demonstrates the conditionality 
within these tendencies.
CSU/CDU governments had already initiated 
some liberalizing reforms in the 1990s, but the 
push towards jus soli in 2000 took place over 
conservative resistance. Political debate centred on 
the loyalty of individuals holding dual citizenship. 
The compromise enacted in 2000 introduced a 
“duty to choose” (Optionspflicht). Germans who had 
acquired citizenship by birth, but whose parents 
were not German, would have to renounce their 
parents’ citizenship (that they also held) between 
the age of 18 and 23 in order to retain German 
citizenship.33 A compromise between the CDU/
CSU and SPD in 2015 revisited the Optionspflicht 
without abandoning it, allowing for dual citizenship 
of jus soli citizens if the young person had graduated 
from or attended school in Germany for six years 
or had been a resident for eight years. However, 
those seeking naturalization who do not meet these 
criteria, and hail from a country outside of the 
European Union, must still renounce their parental 
citizenship.
In addition to the difficulty of legal reform, 
the episode illustrates continued uneasiness 
with multiplicity. In the case of citizenship, 
narrowly construed, this uneasiness refers to 
dual and therefore “divided” national loyalty, 
which is not merely a right-wing concern (as an 
editorial by Jakob Augstein, a prominent left-
wing commentator, in the context of the failed 
coup d’État in Turkey shows).34 The attitude also 
underpins stigma attached to cultural expressions 
of hybridity and mixedness in public life.35 For 
example, in many debates, the Muslim hijab tends 
to be viewed as symptomatic of the failure of 
“integration” in Germany.36 
Language competency is also a terrain of political 
debate, where expectations of uniformity complicate 
the theoretical openness of German citizenship. 
Today, applicants for permanent residence or 
citizenship need to demonstrate a high level 
of competence in a test that is the culmination 
of compulsory “integration courses.”37 Such 
prerequisites for naturalization are often justified in 
civic terms, underlining the importance of linguistic 
competence for participation in public life, which 
has to be achieved before integration begins to take 
place. Yet expectations of linguistic proficiency 
are not merely civic. Survey data shows a strong 
insistence on near-perfect command of the German 
language in order to qualify as “genuinely” German, 
with 40% of those polled expecting that it should be 
spoken without an accent.38 This opinion indicates 
longstanding uneasiness: although newcomers 
are welcome to demonstrate their belonging by 
aspiring to high standards, their presence remains 
problematic where such standards themselves are 
controversial. The concern and expectations about 
linguistic homogeneity correspond to the particular 
stigma attached to “ethnolects,” in particular to the 
fusion of German with Turkish or Arab inflections, 
which tend to be viewed through the prism of 
“failed” integration.39 
As in the case of citizenship law, the historical 
background for expectations of linguistic 
competence is instructive. Efforts at the coercive 
assimilation of Poles working in the western 
industrial regions in the late 19th and early 20th 
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centuries occurred against a background of 
comparable anxiety about linguistic purity. As 
a commentator at the time put it, “young Poles, 
especially the asocial elements among them had 
created a colorless mixed dialect.”40 The response 
towards “guest workers” and their families from the 
1950s, in turn, was hands-off and native language 
instruction available, but as the myth of “return” 
began to crumble, language again became a hot 
button issue. The fear that “parallel societies” 
(Parallelgesellschaften) and ethnic ghettoes would 
develop has been made vivid with reference to 
linguistic difference and alternative cultural codes. 
For example, former Social Democratic politician 
and widely read author, Thilo Sarrazin, alleges that 
Muslim youths occupy a “linguistic nowhere-land.” 
With reference to the Neukölln neighbourhood of 
Berlin, he suggests: 
In a nutshell, the situation in Neukölln exemplifies 
the issue of Muslim immigration. It is about the 
concentration of a lack of education, deficient 
language skills, welfare dependency, traditional 
forms of life, youth criminality, cultural distance, 
and it is about the solidification of this mélange.41 
Sarrazin combines elements of biological and 
cultural racism, denigrating Muslim post-migrants 
with reference to inherited intelligence and cultural 
backwardness. Although his idiosyncratic positions 
mean that he is not a representative figure, his views 
mirror closely an idea of “failed” integration” that 
resonates widely in the public mainstream.
To summarize, if cosmopolitan and liberalizing 
tendencies have had an impact on law and politics, 
and prompted a number of legal and political 
changes in the areas of citizenship and immigration, 
such openings also coincide with continued 
anxiety about the intrusion of “difference.” This 
is particularly evident in concerns about divided 
loyalties and cultural mixing, viewed not as any 
welcome change, but as a social problem. 
Religious Pluralism and the Corporatist 
Model
The religion of migrants that arrived as “guest 
workers” was not widely seen to be a relevant 
fact or significant risk. Outside of domains where 
pragmatic exemptions were sometimes granted, 
such as by employers who offered arrangements 
for the religious practice of Muslim workers, 
requests for more comprehensive forms of religious 
accommodation were not widely registered. 
However now, and as in other country cases, the 
discussion of religious accommodation today is 
coloured by security concerns, which also underpin 
new state initiatives to connect with Muslim 
organizations.
This is the background for a wave of new initiatives 
that aim to incorporate Islam into existing social 
and political arrangements. Initiatives are rarely 
ground breaking but simply seek to extend existing 
templates used for other faith groups. Therefore, 
the potential for greater accommodation of diversity 
or movement towards pluralism is dependent on 
the space available within existing models; and, 
in particular, on the possible incorporation of 
religious, group-based actors into a framework 
of constitutional law regulating German church-
state arrangements. The relevant constitutional 
provisions date back to the Weimar Republic and 
confer important material benefits and stakeholder 
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rights on faith communities that are recognized as 
public corporations (Körperschaft des öffentlichen 
Rechts).
Such corporatist arrangements are a significant 
part of how public life in Germany is organized and 
how public services are provided. Privileges the two 
main Christian denominations (Roman Catholicism 
and Lutheran Protestantism) enjoy in education, 
social care and health, among other areas, are 
largely unavailable to other faith communities that 
until recently had not been granted recognition. 
This absence has been criticized as inappropriate 
for today’s multi-religious circumstances and has 
become the starting point for attempts to expand 
the German religious settlement. Significantly, 
however, neither the adequacy of existing templates 
in light of a declining relevance of Christianity 
nor the possibility of reform is on the table. Nor 
does the movement towards recognition of other 
religions, especially Muslim faith communities, 
enjoy unanimous support, even from the left. For 
example, leading figures within the Green Party, 
which used to be the main carrier of multicultural 
ideas in the 1980s and early 1990s, now offer a 
scathing critique of state engagement with Muslim 
organizations.42
It is worth asking what the benefit of inclusion 
into the corporatist settlement might be. Minority 
religious organization in Germany have largely 
grown out of precarious and under-funded 
community initiatives or, as in the case of the 
Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs 
(DİTİB), retained strong homeland ties.43 For 
such organizations, inclusion might be a way of 
building capacity as well as achieving visibility and 
voice. It accords symbolic recognition, strengthens 
the ability to offer a range of faith-based services 
to constituencies and allows for participation 
in consultations on important matters of public 
concern, ranging from the provision of social 
care for elderly people to the regulation of state 
broadcasters. 
The most significant initiative towards Muslim 
incorporation has been the German Islamic 
Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, DIK) that 
has provided a new phase of state engagement 
with Muslim organizations and individual 
representatives since 2006. The DIK’s aim has been 
to develop a “reasonable relationship” between 
government and various Muslim representatives, 
and to explore “if and how Islam as a ‘religion 
without a church’ can live up to the organizational 
requirements of the German constitutional church 
law (Religionsverfassungsrecht)” and qualify for 
the benefits of state recognition.44 Currently, the 
DIK’s third phase considers welfare and issues 
of pastoral care. The German Islam Council 
(Deutscher Islamrat), which had been excluded 
from consultations in response to questions about 
its constitutional loyalty, has been re-invited.
It has become clear that state recognition comes 
with strings attached. Participating associations 
have been expected to re-iterate commitments 
to liberal values and constitutional principles. 
The state’s interest in dialogue with Muslim 
organizations has also meant that groups have had 
to present themselves in religious terms and that 
issues that received space during the discussion 
had to be presented primarily within a religious 
framework.45 
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The status quo of religious accommodation across 
the Federal Republic shows considerable variance. 
The DIK’s national initiative coincided with local 
attempts to open existing corporatist arrangements 
to Muslim associations for the provision of religious 
education, the training of Imams, and towards 
parity with Christian actors in the delivery of 
social and health services, for example. The city-
states of Hamburg and Bremen have responded to 
requests by some Islamic organizations and adopted 
a “contract” (Staatsvertrag) with three groups 
each.46 The larger Lower Saxony Land is currently 
finalizing a similar compact that would regulate, 
among other issues, Islamic burial, the recognition 
of Islamic holidays and the participation of Muslim 
organizations in public consultative bodies. 
Although such agreements respond to requests from 
and constitute a form of symbolic recognition that 
associations clearly desire, they also show traces of 
continued suspicion towards the Muslim presence. 
For example, the Bremen and Hamburg contracts 
make an explicit reference to gender equality, a 
mention that is not present in similar agreements 
with non-Muslim religions.47 
Other Länder, especially where the capacity of 
Muslim organizations is less developed, have 
not made similar advances. Despite widespread 
popular support for the measure, Bavaria recently 
decided to deny exceptions to the mandatory use 
of coffins, preventing Islamic burials in that large 
Land.48 North Rhine-Westphalia, with the largest 
population of any Land, favours a case-by-case 
approach to ordering the relationship with Muslim 
associations. 
One of the main dilemmas in this area is not just a 
lack of desire to make space for a new religion, but 
the inflexibility of existing corporatist structures, 
which precludes progress. Some Länder have shown 
themselves to be recalcitrant or have simply chosen 
to ignore any request for change. The openings that 
other Länder are beginning to adopt are significant, 
however, and may lead to more comprehensive 
revisions of church-state structures over time.
The negotiation of individual rights and respect 
for diversity within such structures reveals 
comparable patterns of resistance, but also the 
gradual reduction of opposition over time, often 
instigated through the German courts. As in many 
other contexts, the visibility of women’s religious 
dress or signs provides a site for the negotiation 
of secularism, national identity and rights-based 
claims.49 The case of Fereshta Ludin, whose hijab 
was grounds for precluding her employment as a 
teacher, is emblematic of patterns of resistance and 
some recent progress. In 1998, Baden-Württemberg 
blocked Ludin’s entry into the civil service and 
therefore her employment as a teacher. Educational 
authorities argued that (regardless of any desire 
to proselytize) the hijab would inevitably harm 
students’ “negative religious freedom.” A 2003 
ruling by the Constitutional Court rejected Baden-
Württemberg’s argument that the headscarf was 
a statement of “cultural separatism and therefore 
not just a religious, but also a political symbol.”50 
However, in a remarkable judicial contortion, the 
Court also facilitated the subsequent adoption 
of bans. As a principle for adjudicating religious 
symbols, it underscored the importance of an 
“objective horizon of reception” (objektiver 
Empfängerhorizont), and it gave significant 
weight to the possibility that the hijab could be 
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detrimental to “school peace.”51 Where provisions 
in Länder-based educational law did not allow for 
restrictions, the Court encouraged states to choose: 
either safeguard the practice; or adopt stringent 
laws banning the hijab on the grounds of preventing 
conflict in educational institutions. Half the German 
Länder, including those with the highest number 
of Muslim inhabitants, followed the second route, 
justifying their bans with hypothetical scenarios of 
disturbances to the peace in schools.52 
In 2015, the Constitutional Court revisited its initial 
ruling in a case from North Rhine-Westphalia. Two 
state employees, a teacher and a social worker, 
brought the case jointly. Educational authorities 
terminated the employment of the teacher for 
wearing the hijab, whereas the social worker had 
sought to comply with the ban by replacing the 
headscarf with a woolly hat, along with a turtleneck 
sweater, before being given written warning from 
school authorities and threatened with termination. 
Tribunals up to the Constitutional Court, including 
the Federal Employment Tribunal, found that 
even a commercially available hat constituted an 
expression of faith and could be prohibited.55 
Examining the ban that North Rhine-Westphalia 
had imposed, the Constitutional Court undertook 
a more thorough consideration of the religious 
freedom clause in the constitutional Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz). It took issue with local provisions 
that required teachers to “refrain from political, 
religious, ideological or other external statements 
that are liable to endanger or disturb the state’s 
neutrality towards pupils and parents or political, 
religious or ideological school peace.”53 In the 
North Rhine-Westphalian case, these provisions 
had explicitly exempted “Christian or Occidental 
values of education and culture or traditions” from 
requirements of neutrality as these were considered 
part of the state’s “educational mission.”54 
In its 2015 dismissal of these provisions in the 
Land’s school law, the Constitutional Court found 
that they only made sense if Christianity were 
treated as the quasi-neutral ground on which all 
other expressions of religion were required to 
compete. Thus, the Constitutional Court struck 
down exemptions for “Christian-Occidental” 
religious signs. It reaffirmed the state interest in 
protecting “school peace and state neutrality,” while 
qualifying the scope of that interest. Threats could 
no longer be invoked if they were hypothetical and 
abstract; they had to be realistic and concrete.56 
Even in such cases, they could not lead to the 
termination of teachers’ employment, if other 
measures were available. Parental rights and the 
“negative” protection of pupils’ religious freedom 
did not justify a wholesale ban on the headscarf. 
The North Rhine-Westphalian school law has since 
been revised and other Länder are also moving to 
make their school regulations compatible with this 
constitutional interpretation.
It is too early to judge the significance of this shift. 
The response among educators is mixed, and major 
teachers’ organizations have condemned the 2015 
judgment.57 The distinction between abstract and 
concrete threats to school peace is likely to be 
blurred and leave scope for continued restrictions. 
Some Länder, such as the city-state of Berlin, 
continue their exclusion of the headscarf under 
comprehensive neutrality requirements that have so 
far not been successfully challenged. Popular views 
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on the issue are divided, although more than 70% of 
those under the age of 25 endorse teachers’ right to 
wear the hijab.58 
The exclusion of Muslim religious practice, while 
treating Christianity as neutral ground, is certainly 
not exceptional to Germany. Just as in other 
contexts, highly visible exclusions—as the case of 
mediatized conflicts over the hijab—are likely also 
to provoke forms of discriminations that are much 
less visible. Various studies have established that 
Muslim women in particular suffer from significant 
disadvantage. The “horizon of reception” that the 
Constitutional Court invoked in 2003 (penalizing 
Muslim women for negative perceptions of their 
Muslimness) has some role to play among such 
experiences. Expected discontent among customers, 
for example, provides grounds for excluding Muslim 
women from positions of customer-facing jobs 
in the service economy.59 Despite the adoption of 
comprehensive equalities legislation in line with 
European Union requirements, such inequalities 
are also reflected in differential outcomes for post-
migrants across many areas of social and economic 
life.60 
The Economic Model, Labour Market and 
Welfare State
The state-sponsored recruitment of “guest workers” 
ended in 1973. After that, permission for labour 
migration could only be acquired under exceptional 
circumstances.61 The early 2000s saw the re-
emergence of political interest in labour migration, 
targeted at highly skilled migrants, particularly IT 
specialists, who were often believed to be in India 
and only waiting to move. Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder celebrated the “competition for the best 
and the brightest” in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, 
the move to loosen up recruitment provoked 
considerable resistance. In response to proposed 
migration quotas to meet the needs of the digital 
economy, the conservative candidate in North 
Rhine-Westphalia campaigned in 2000 for Kinder 
statt Inder (“children instead of Indians”). Nor did 
the temporary and restrictive visas (mis-labelled 
as “green cards”) that were proposed as part of 
this first initiative attract the expected number of 
applicants.62 
In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, 
Germany again became a popular destination 
for labour migration from within and outside the 
European Union.63 Structural shortages of system-
relevant and specialized labour drives migration 
policy-making at this point, including recruitment 
of skilled labour and trainees for the country’s 
system of vocational education upon which much of 
its economic success is considered to rest.
Since 2008 additional efforts to respond to the 
perceived requirements of global competitiveness 
have paved the way for a range of liberalizations. 
Advances in the recognition of foreign professional 
qualifications in 2012, for example, mean that 
Germany now can be described as a model case of 
labour market mobility.64 Conservative politicians 
have reversed their opposition to a revision of the 
2005 immigration law, which may be considered 
after the 2017 election.65 With signs of a re-
politicization of immigration in light of recent 
events, the direction of further reforms is difficult 
to predict, though it is clear that labour market 
and demographic considerations will play a role in 
future reform packages.66
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Assumed economic benefits of immigration also 
shape the experience of recent migrants. The 
rationale for labour migration in the 1960s and 
1970s had been a controlled absorption of migrants 
in niches that needed filling due to German workers’ 
upward mobility. The resulting working conditions 
and discrimination that significant numbers 
experienced have been documented in reports, such 
as Günter Wallraff’s Ganz Unten (Lowest of the 
Low, 1985).67 In an economy that puts a premium 
on flexibility and knowledge, today’s labour 
migrants are less likely to face such conditions. 
Yet growing chauvinism is directed at unskilled 
migrants whose economic utility is in doubt, often 
as a result of specific cultural markers.
There is indeed a stark contrast between the 
acceptance accorded to populations depending 
on their presumed ability to meet expectations of 
utility. As Thomas Faist and Christian Ulbricht 
suggest:
[w]hen it comes to debates about the so-called 
highly qualified from abroad who Germany 
wants to attract, and highly qualified German 
citizens who work abroad as professionals and 
scientists, the absence of talk about integration 
is striking. […] Categorizations in terms of 
economic utility seem to be reserved for highly 
skilled immigrants and German citizens who are 
emigrants, whereas low-status immigrants have 
been categorized in terms of culture.68 
A welcoming attitude towards highly skilled 
migrants contrasts with a negative assessment of the 
economic usefulness of many long-time residents 
and hostility towards unskilled migration, especially 
where it is considered a burden on social services 
and the welfare state. In all this, recent immigrants 
and settled post-migrants tend to be painted with 
the same brush.
The openness towards diversity and the 
potential for pluralism that is encapsulated in 
Willkommenskultur does not gainsay this account 
of on-going patterns of exclusion and limited 
pluralism in the area of work. While it may be 
possible to discount PEGIDA or AfD as fringe 
movements, there is evidence of suspicion towards 
Muslims and many immigrants that is firmly rooted 
in the mainstream as well. It is sustained by new 
differentiations along boundaries of deservingness 
with respect to both employment and public 
services. These boundaries would limit the benefits 
of hospitality to individuals deemed skilled, mobile 
and cosmopolitan. The relevant expectations are 
especially demanding  in the case of individuals and 
groups deemed suspect, disloyal and undeserving by 
default. 
IV. EMERGING LESSONS
The focus of this paper has been on changes over 
the 25 years since the reunification of the two 
Germanys. These modifications have materialized 
in politics and law as well as in growing levels of 
contact, a new social visibility of difference and 
changing attitudes across generations.69 The paper 
seeks to identify the spaces for greater pluralism 
in a situation traversed by contradictions, in 
particular with respect to civic and ethno-cultural 
interpretations of national identity in the domains 
of citizenship and immigration law, religious 
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recognition, and labour markets. In light of these 
contradictions, the prospects for progress as well as 
the risk of anti-pluralist retrenchment are difficult 
to anticipate accurately. The response by political 
actors and in civil society to the arrival of refugees 
reinforces a sense of uncertainty. Political decisions 
in the near and medium-term future, as well as the 
impact of growing xenophobic mobilization, are 
difficult to assess; they may fade away or profoundly 
change the tone of the narrative presented here. 
Prediction is further complicated as the drivers 
of immigration exceed domestic control. An 
overarching sense of “crisis” underpins increasingly 
desperate efforts by European states, including 
Germany, to reduce arrival numbers and implement 
a range of punitive anti-immigrant measures. It is 
distinctly possible that pluralist potentials that have 
been outlined in this paper will be squandered or 
destroyed as a result.
Focusing on domestic politics, this paper has 
considered tendencies of inclusion and exclusion 
that often emerge in close proximity and even in 
relationship to one another. Damani Partridge’s 
notion of “exclusionary incorporation” usefully 
accounts for a form of conditional openness 
that is evident in the German case. Exclusionary 
incorporation envisages a place for newcomers and 
subsequent generations subject to wide-ranging 
expectations that are presented in the form of 
moving targets of desirable conduct and cultural 
assimilation. Rather than granting civic equality, 
it concedes inclusion to “compromised subjects” 
that continue to be monitored for markers of 
difference that are deemed threatening.70 The 
cosmopolitan hospitality of the so-called welcoming 
culture (Willkommenskultur) and the pluralist 
achievements that have been made over the past 25 
years are compatible with this type of conditional 
acceptance of manifestations of diversity that 
remains conditional and provisional.
This concluding section reviews this narrative and 
considers contradictory tendencies of inclusion 
and exclusion with a focus on liberal ideas, political 
institutions and civil society, before outlining 
potentials for pluralist change.
Illiberal Liberalism 
Just as in other Western European country cases, 
it is no longer ethno-cultural exclusions alone, but 
also new forms of “liberal intolerance,” that shape 
the experience of ethno-cultural minority groups, 
especially Muslims.71 In Germany, in particular the 
canon of attitudes and values that immigrant and 
post-migrant groups and individuals are asked to 
embrace have become subject to anxious debates 
over the terms of integration. The concepts invoked 
in such debates are not stable, and integration itself 
is an ambiguous concept. As previously suggested, it 
can mean assimilation and anxiety about it usually 
privileges causal stories in which individuals’ 
or communities’ lack of effort are invoked to 
explain failure. Its relative emptiness allows for 
representatives of the dominant majority to hold 
ill-defined standards over the heads of newcomers 
whose belonging remains in doubt and whose 
loyalty and deservingness require perpetual proof.72 
The risk that the Muslim presence is seen to 
pose, for example, can be understood in relation 
to a Judeo-Christian dominant culture, to a civic 
settlement of liberalism and human rights or to the 
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proposition that Judeo-Christianity and liberalism 
align automatically. Each of these positions invokes 
a contrast between the Muslim “other” and a 
national self, and makes inclusion conditional upon 
ill-defined expectations being met. 
Andreas Scheuer, the General Secretary of the 
CSU—the Christian Democratic Union’s Bavarian 
sister party—recently issued a demand for a 
“German common culture (Leitkultur) instead of 
multiculturalism (Multikulti),” saying: 
Germany’s common culture is much more than 
the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). It includes our 
traditions, our way of life and our common 
values. Someone who sends his wife into the 
street wearing a burqa does not violate the 
Basic Law. But he pays no respect at all to our 
common culture. […] Integration cannot mean 
that the native population and refugees meet 
half way and that a new shared culture emerges. 
There is only one direction: accept our values.73 
In this view, the constitutional minimum of 
the Basic Law is insufficient and needs to be 
complemented with forms of desirable conduct 
that are often vaguely defined or impossibly 
comprehensive. Regardless of how prominently 
either civic or ethno-cultural requirements of 
belonging feature in such arguments about 
belonging, inclusion of newcomers and acceptance 
of post-migrants remain conditional upon arbitrary 
expectations or targets that are moving. As 
described in Section III, this ambiguity in public 
policy is mirrored in popular expectations of 
cultural uniformity, in terms of dress (no hijab) and 
language (excellent German). The much-invoked 
welcoming culture (Willkommenskultur) does not 
mean that an immigrant or post-migrant presence 
is welcome unconditionally or allowed to disturb 
established patterns and identities. As a group of 
three young authors in a book recounting their 
experience as “New Germans” put it:
Including our passport and our language, we are 
German by socialization and upbringing; why 
one of us is made to feel alien, and the other 
isn’t, results from decisions that others make 
on the basis of arbitrary criteria. Their rejection 
is directed at one group, then the next, and for 
some years it has been experienced in particular 
by Turks and Arabs. What remains is the feeling 
that one is always liable to the possibility of 
exclusion.74 
This experience also casts doubt on two available 
paths towards pluralism—opening social and legal 
arrangements to newcomers, or expanding their 
rights as individuals—that the paper has considered 
at various points. On the one hand, inclusion into 
German citizenship, labour markets or corporatist 
church-state arrangements, is rarely unconditional 
and, where granted, it often remains insecure. In 
the aftermath of the failed coup d’État in Turkey 
in July 2016, heightened anxiety about the loyalty 
of dual citizens, and renewed initiatives to abolish 
their status, illustrate the conditionality of progress 
in the area of citizenship. On the other hand, the 
expansion of liberal rights that could buttress post-
migrants’ cultural claims while offering protections 
against discrimination on the basis of “race”, is 
distinctly uneven. Significant decisions, such as the 
Constitutional Court’s revocation of exclusionary 
school laws, often fail to cut through the patchwork 
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of practices in the federal system. As a result, 
the German case is characterised by differential 
practices of accommodation and continued 
exclusion. 
There are additional reasons why the promise of 
expansion of liberal rights may be insufficient for 
progress towards pluralism. Liberalism is hardly 
conducive to pluralist inclusion if it demarcates a 
liberal “civilization”—a canon of values, attitudes 
and beliefs that are traced to historical legacies and 
cultural particularities. This civilizational rendering 
of liberalism, which has become prominent in 
German public debate, is sustained through the 
contrast with minority groups that are suspected 
of failing to adhere to liberal tenets or whose 
professed allegiance is deemed superficial and 
insincere. A series of contestations about religious 
minority practice illustrates such contrasts. In 2012, 
for example, a legislative initiative to secure an 
entitlement to practice underage male circumcision 
for Muslims and Jews, which a state court in the city 
of Cologne had found to be a violation of children’s 
physical integrity, was met with considerable 
resistance. 75 Opponents of the practice mobilized 
predominantly liberal arguments, centring on 
children’s rights and self-determination, and 
forged a powerful coalition against circumcision 
in the public mainstream. Yet the debate also 
revealed that anti-pluralist argumentation by self-
described liberals is rarely just liberal. In the case of 
circumcision, it entailed the portrayal of minority 
practices as “bloody” and “barbarian,” tracing 
alleged pathologies among German Turks, for 
example, to fanciful accounts of early-year trauma. 
It also reflected a cultural horizon that overlaps 
closely with Christian conceptions of normality, 
such as when prominent opponents of circumcision 
offered an explicit invitation for Muslims and Jews 
to replicate the “moral progress” that Christianity 
had already achieved.76
In parts of the conservative mainstream, as well 
as among new actors on the populist right, the 
common request that newcomers comply with 
“our values”, is hardly just about compliance with 
liberal principles. Distorted historical references 
to a “Judeo-Christian tradition” as the basis for 
the German commitment to liberal ideas often 
underpin such requests, which—as the paper has 
argued—often conceal expectations of cultural 
uniformity. Political rhetoric that invokes liberalism 
thus needs to be scrutinized and the multiple 
uses of liberal ideas in public debate need to be 
examined, which in the German case is likely to 
reveal that the civilizational rendering of liberalism 
provides an attractive language for today’s ethno-
nationalists. The current multiplicity of crises—
affecting the economy, the domain of immigrant 
integration, and the legitimacy of the political 
system more generally—offers new opportunities 
for them to articulate their concerns. It allows for 
the stark framing of social problems as failures 
of previous policy approaches that, in the case of 
immigrant integration, are described as too lenient, 
accommodating, and tolerant. 77 The rejection of 
liberal permissiveness, and the demand for a more 
hard-edged “muscular” liberalism, draws on such 
accounts, which are attractive but rarely hold up to 
scrutiny. The prominent narrative that identifies 
Angela Merkel’s hospitality towards refugees in 
2015 as cause for catastrophic outcomes only 
follows established patterns. It continues prominent 
accounts that portray the ambition to achieve 
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pluralism in Germany to be in perpetual state of 
crisis.
Inclusion and Institutional Control
Ambivalence about the direction of change is 
also evident in state efforts towards institutional 
incorporation for German Muslims, in particular. 
The German Islamic Conference represents an 
avenue of inclusion that became possible due to 
state interest in controlling populations that were 
registered as Muslim and thus considered in need 
of safeguarding.78 Initiatives by the Länder to bring 
Muslim associations into the framework of church-
state relations continue to reflect a double interest 
in incorporation and control. 
As different phases of the DIK experience show, the 
state approach towards Muslims still tends to focus 
on security. Elements of the current approach date 
back to earlier times, not least to the era of the Alien 
Act that framed the presence of non-citizens as a 
security challenge and under the authority of the 
police, particularly after 1973 and the end of labour 
recruitment, when the management of migration 
shifted from the Ministry of Labour to the Ministry 
of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 
BMI).79 The securitization of Islam after 9/11 
reinforced already existing patterns.
The BMI continues to act as the main institutional 
actor in the federal state’s outreach to Muslims. 
Under different ministers, strong concerns 
about the constitutional loyalty of Muslims were 
articulated from within the BMI, leading to 
questionable actions. In one recent episode, the 
ministry leaked survey findings to the right-wing 
tabloid press that were deliberately misinterpreted 
to arrive at the worst possible portrait of attitudes 
among young German Muslims.80
The BMI’s attitude exemplifies the importance of 
organizational dispositions and knowledge, and 
institutional behaviour for the state’s approach 
towards diversity. Recent lapses, in particular the 
failure to investigate a series of murders committed 
by the National-Socialist Underground (NSU), have 
challenged trust in institutions.81 This applies in 
particular to the Federal Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) and its 
Länder-based affiliates, which have the double 
role of being a domestic security agency and the 
adjudicator of constitutional loyalty. Their failure to 
detect the right-wing background of the murders, 
and a structural inclination to treat victims of racist 
violence as suspects or perpetrators, underpins 
a crisis of credibility. Half-hearted attempts to 
police right-wing protests, and the failure to 
respond strongly to violent attacks on refugees, 
are beginning to be more widely criticized. Such 
shortcomings are widespread, but have attracted 
particular interest in the case of Saxony, where a 
large number of attacks on refugee reception centres 
occurred. Saxon security agencies have been more 
inclined to suppress rather than support civil society 
resistance against such attacks and against the neo-
fascist movements that are particularly powerful in 
the Land.
Civil Society and Change from Below
As a result of changes to the law, formal citizenship 
(Staatsbürgerschaft), has become more accessible, 
and this opening is also partially matched by 
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symbolic revisions of national identity and everyday 
understandings of citizenship.82 If encounters across 
a variety of social settings are the relevant measure, 
it can be suggested that Germany is experiencing 
what Stuart Hall claimed for Britain in the 1990s, 
a multicultural “drift” resulting from “undirected 
sociological processes” rather than from “deliberate 
and planned policy.”83 The increasing visibility 
of difference challenges cultural expectations of 
homogeneity, and such challenges are no longer 
confined to urban areas that might have been 
painted as exceptions or to some neighbourhoods of 
concentrated “immigrant” populations and qualified 
as dangerous failures. 
The hope that can be pinned on social change and 
bottom-up movement towards pluralism is limited, 
however. This type of progress is uneven at best, 
and a big picture often difficult to discern in the 
German case. There is evidence that attitudes and 
experiences have grown more de-synchronized 
between the former East Germany and the West, 
but also for growing disenchantment with new 
realities of diversity among sections of society 
that are becoming more fundamentalist and 
militant. The PEGIDA mobilizations of 2015 or 
the AfD’s increasing electoral success, alongside 
the presence of the neo-Nazi National Democratic 
Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 
NPD) in regions with low to modest levels of 
diversity, illustrates the strength of anti-pluralist 
potential in civil society. The mobilization of the far 
right alongside large numbers of individuals self-
described as “concerned citizens” (besorgte Bürger) 
has grown in force. Although these movements have 
not yet reached the strength of, for example, the 
French Front National, the AfD’s electoral success 
– exceeding 20% of the vote in some Länder – 
suggests that this can no longer be ruled out.
The mixed picture in this paper extends to symbolic 
acknowledgments of diversity within the nation, 
to policies intended to promote integration and 
practices of institutional incorporation, and 
to the normalization of difference in everyday 
settings alongside the rejection of the same in 
growing xenophobic mobilizations. Along with the 
incompleteness of pluralist advances in different 
domains, as emphasized in this paper, there are also 
potentials and pivot points for movement towards 
pluralism, such as in the areas of regulation, 
participation and mobilization.
Regulation
More than anything, the German case illustrates 
some of the pitfalls of regulation. The history of 
the Alien Act reflected fantasies of control and the 
attempt to subject diversity to stringent regulatory 
designs. Social processes that defy regulation 
have been met with hostility. This is the case for 
phenomena of cultural mixing, which often continue 
to be viewed as pathologies, not least because they 
occur outside of the state’s regulatory purview. It is 
no surprise, then, that interventions such as Thilo 
Sarrazin’s nativist commentary, hark back to an 
image of the homogeneous and well-ordered society 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The AfD’s political agenda 
is equally distinguished by the desire to reduce 
complexity, such as its defence of state sovereignty 
against immaterial social forces or its commitment 
to rescue the “traditional family.”84
More generally, progress towards pluralism may 
Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies    21Global Centre for Pluralism
Citizenship, Nationality and Immigration in Germany
depend on policy-making that takes notice of socio-
political realities before seeking to bend them to 
regulatory designs. Historically, the German state 
has not shown this inclination and has—often 
based on wishful thinking (e.g., about “return”)—
implemented policies that bore little relationship 
to facts on the ground. This also evident in the 
policy area of integration, which continues to be 
subject to a series of detailed and tightly controlled 
schemes, sketched out in “integration measures” 
(Integrationsmassnahmen) or “integration 
schedules” (Integrationsfahrpläne). Such measures 
often envisage little scope for the unplanned 
and conceive of everyday processes of cultural 
production and exchange not as potential, but risk. 
Yet, in recent years, the failure of past regulations is 
more frequently registered. The active contribution 
of immigrant and post-migrant populations to 
measures that affect their livelihoods is (slowly) 
beginning be perceived as a relevant fact, not least 
also because these populations have become more 
visible and assertive.
Participation
Newcomers and subsequent generations have not 
been impassive to their situation, and have made 
claims for greater pluralism in the institutional 
and social spaces available. At times, they have 
been identified as “stakeholders” and invited to 
participate in consultations about the terms of 
their inclusion, such as through the DIK or in 
initiatives by the Länder. As the DIK illustrates, 
the opportunities that arise as a result do not 
necessarily provide for full empowerment, but are 
still being conducted within the rules of the game 
rather than questioning them, and reproducing a 
hierarchy in which those invited to such so-called 
free exchanges still find themselves in subordinate 
positions.85 
Yet there is potential in such initiatives. The DIK 
created openings by making contestation possible, 
allowing actors to make their presence known and 
criticize restrictions imposed on the terms of their 
participation. In this, it mirrors other forms of 
participatory governance mechanisms that, despite 
tokenism, can give new entrants a foot in the door.86 
The relevant policy designs often allow for some 
types of re-appropriation by actors that are invited 
to participate. The potential for a pivot towards 
pluralism, then, lies in new actors’ capacity to make 
use of such spaces. The opening of corporatist 
structures that previously did not envisage a 
post-migrant voice should not only be judged by 
immediate outcomes; the changes that some Länder 
are beginning to adopt may lead to transformations 
that are not currently envisaged but emerge as 
unintended results of new and challenging forms of 
agency. 
Mobilization
Potentials for pluralism require political 
mobilization to be achieved. The distinctive 
achievement of 2015, for example, was a significant 
civil society effort at welcoming refugees. Although 
now less visible, this effort continues, albeit 
with regional discrepancies and variation in the 
strength of neighbourhood initiatives. These local 
efforts often step in where public authorities fail 
to deliver. Such efforts give some credibility to the 
often evoked but not always well-defined notion of 
a Willkommenskultur. It also distinguishes recent 
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events from more widespread indifference and 
hostility towards refugees in the early 1990s when 
the arrival of asylum seekers from the war-torn 
Balkan countries prompted attacks against them, 
hostile rhetoric, and eventually tightened asylum 
laws. 
Xenophobic mobilizations have also been 
countered, although the strength of this opposition 
varies. In 2015 PEGIDA protests in Dresden were 
often unhindered, indeed with local authorities 
discouraging counter-protests. Xenophobia is 
deeply embedded in many milieus across East and 
West Germany and in numerous localities so-called 
concerned citizens feel entitled not just to express 
verbal hostility to pluralism, but also to act on their 
beliefs, as the proliferation of violent attacks on 
refugee reception centres indicates. PEGIDA has 
embraced the slogan Wir sind das Volk (We are the 
people) that was previously associated with the 1989 
East German revolution, and perpetrators of racist 
violence often present themselves as upright citizens 
acting in the interest and name of a silent majority. 
At this juncture, progress towards pluralism will 
require a very strong challenge to such claims but 
the de-synchronization of attitudes and growing 
levels of polarization make it likely that there will 
continue to be significant contestations in electoral 
arenas and civil society rather than any unanimous 
position.
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